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The decisions taken by the EU finance ministers at the Ecofin Council meeting in 
December 2007, in response to the turmoil in the markets, highlight the urgent need to 
subject the current European supervisory set-up to a more radical review. The measures 
proposed and the mandates given to the Commission and the supervisory committees 
constitute little more than short-term plumbing, lacking any long-term vision and a 
coherent institutional framework. The clearest example of this short-sightedness is the 
move to allow supervisory committees to take decisions by majority vote. Although this 
move is to be welcomed, it lacks any legal basis, as it concerns committees that are 
empowered to act merely in an advisory capacity, and whose advice can thus be ignored 
by member states, as some have already implied is their intention. 
 
The EU finance ministers managed to react rapidly to the financial market crisis. The 
informal Ecofin in Oporto in September laid the basis for a co-called ‘roadmap’, which 
was adopted in October regarding European financial stability arrangements. The review 
of the Lamfalussy framework by the December Ecofin allowed ministers to evaluate the 
supervisory set-up under the current circumstances. This review process resulted in an 
enormous agenda of actions to be taken by the European Commission and the Level 3 
Committees over the coming months.  
 
The October Ecofin Council decided on common principles for cross-border financial crisis 
management and on a roadmap to practically enhance supervisory cooperation. The 
common principles aim to protect the stability of the financial system and to minimise 
harmful impacts on the economy. Ministers are at pains to insist that they will “carefully 
cooperate” in the case of a cross-border crisis and will react “based on common 
terminology and on a common analytical framework”, but this language seems to mask 
important differences in approach, and underscores the need for more binding common 
rules.  
 
The concrete roadmap designed to reach agreement on these principles sheds light on 
just how much still needs to be done. Member states are ‘encouraged’ to sign ‘voluntary 
cooperation arrangements’ as soon as possible. In the course of 2008, the Commission 
should propose ways to clarify cooperation obligations amongst authorities, covering 
information-sharing and day-to-day supervision. This highlights how much the exchange 
of supervisory information is a problem in the EU and how little progress along these 
lines has been achieved to date. The mandate also calls upon the Commission to clarify 
the scope of the EU’s deposit guarantee directive, which proved to be clearly insufficient 
in light of the Northern Rock failure.  
 
The December Ecofin Council spelled out the role of the regulatory and supervisory 
Committees in this context. It assigned several near-impossible tasks: for example, the 
European Commission was asked to consider various options to strengthen the Level 3 Committees “without unbalancing the current institutional structure”, and the Level 3 
Committees were requested to strengthen the national application of their guidelines 
“without changing their legally non-binding nature”, and to enhance their efficiency “by 
introducing (…) qualified majority voting where necessary”. A further illustration of this 
entirely contradictory set of expectations is the demand to the Level 3 Committees to 
analyse the options of “voluntary delegation of supervisory competences”. On the other 
hand, formal recognition of their role is implied by Ecofin’s demand to the European 
Commission that it considers financial support under the EU budget for the Level 3 
Committees. 
 
One minister, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, courageously denounced this contradictory 
situation in a letter to all his European colleagues by calling for formal changes in EU 
legislation to entrust the Level 3 Committees with the powers to adopt binding decisions, 
and to endow them with adequate financial and human resources to perform their tasks. 
He observed that, in view of the recent financial market turmoil, the European financial 
system was still unable to effectively respond to the challenges of a globally integrated 
market. Voluntary agreements, the Italian minister remarked, proved incapable of 
ensuring an efficient area-wide supervisory teamwork during crisis episodes. The Level 3 
Committees should therefore be turned into agencies, with the powers to set binding 
standards and to take decisions in a limited number of areas. 
 
While the changes introduced in 2001 with the Lamfalussy approach were a decisive step 
forward, the recent financial market turmoil has highlighted the need to take a further 
quantum step in order to achieve genuine European financial market supervision. The 
Level 3 Committees have fulfilled an extremely useful role in this direction, but further 
market integration requires a substantial upgrading of their role from the purely advisory 
function they fulfil today. The Italian finance minister speaks about minor adjustments to 
Community law, but the problems encountered with the exchange of supervisory 
information amongst authorities, the delegation of supervisory tasks, the need for an 
authority to be capable of exercising an EU-wide mandate and take EU-wide supervisory 
decisions, all call for substantial changes to the current set-up, allowing for full 
transparency and clarity in the division of responsibilities. In short, the cause of financial 
supervision is not well served by half-baked solutions. 
 